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NLRB v. Catholic Bishop: Lay Teachers
Seek More Than Good Shepherd to Protect

Their Rights
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,1 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
held that coverage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)s does not
extend to lay teachers employed by church-operated schools which include both religious and secular subjects in their curriculums.' As will be
seen, this conclusion was reached not on traditional first amendment
analysis, but instead on narrow statutory construction.
Prior to the decision in Catholic Bishop, the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) had long wrestled with jurisdictional issues pertaining to
nonprofit educational institutions. The 1951 decision in Trustees of Columbia University' made firm the Board's choice to refuse jurisdiction
over these institutions. However, in 1970, the Board overruled Columbia,
and in Cornell UniversityO held that the policies of the NLRA would best
be effectuated by asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions of
higher education. 6
In 1974, the issue arose again, this time as applied to secondary schools.
In Henry M. Hald High School Association,7 the Board asserted jurisdiction over a system of Catholic high schools in the Archdiocese of Brook1. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
2. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. A
final amendment was the Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to "the NLRA" unless otherwise specified.
3. 440 U.S. at 507.
4. 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
5. 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
6. Id. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271. Cornell was decided on the basis of the substantial
effect that colleges and universities exerted on commerce. The Act seeks to protect the flow
of commerce for reasons stated in § 2 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). The Board also discussed whether the term "employer" as found in
§ 3(e) of the Landrum-Griffin Act (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976)), applied to
educational institutions. The Board also noted that the statute did not specifically exempt
educational institutions from jurisdiction. 183 N.L.R.B. at 334, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1271.
7. 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 87 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1974).
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lyn. However, the issue was not decided on the basis of the first amendment, but instead on the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that
neither the NLRA nor the Constitution required lay teachers employed
by a religious institution to surrender their rights of self-organization. 8
A more flexible standard was formulated in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore,' in which the Board announced its intention to decline
jurisdiction over only those schools which were completely religious, and
not merely religiously associated. 10 The test proved to be unsatisfactory,
although it was used by the Board to assert jurisdiction in Catholic
Bishop," its companion case," and at least one other decision. 8
The Baltimore test was the predominant standard for determining the
validity of the Board's jurisdiction when, in 1974 and 1975, petitions for
representation were filed with the Board by union organizations interested in representing lay teachers at two separate groups of Catholic high
schools."1 One group, operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, consisted of Quigley North and Quigley South, two private religiously
oriented high schools. These schools described themselves in their catalogues as metropolitan, contemporary, and college preparatory high
schools. Admissions were open to students who, in the opinions of their
parish priests, had "the kind of character, ability and temperament which
might lead to the personal discovery of a vocation in the priesthood.""5
The other group of schools, the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, consisted of five high schools. These schools were also religiously oriented,
and had compulsory religion requirements in their curriculums.
The employers in each group contended that the schools failed to meet
the jurisdictional criteria of the NLRA, since no single school had gross
income of over one million dollars.'8 This argument was rejected by the
8. 213 N.L.R.B. at 418 n.7. The right to self-organization is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976), which describes employees' rights, including rights to organize, to join a union, to
bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.
9. 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975).
10. Id. at 250.
11. 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 90 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1975).
1975) (order
12. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., No. 25-RC-5984 (NLRB, -,
granting certification).
13. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178, 94 L.R.R.M. 1719 (1977).
14. Catholic Bishop, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 90 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1975); Diocese of Fort Wayne1975).
South Bend, Inc., No. 25-RC-5984 (NLRB, -,
15. 220 N.L.R.B. at 359, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
16. The definitions of "commerce" and "affecting commerce" in § 2(6) and (7) (29 U.S.C.
§ 152(6),(7) (1976)) have been further clarified by the NLRB in 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1979),
which states:
The Board will assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising under sections 8, 9,
and 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit college or university which has a
gross annual revenue from all sources (excluding only contributions which, be-
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Board, which considered each group of schools to be an "integrated enterprise" whose operating budgets totaled over one million dollars. The
Board held that the NLRA's jurisdictional requirement that the schools
affect commerce
was satisfied, and accordingly ordered union elections in
17
each case.

The Board brushed aside the employers' contentions that this would
constitute an improper entanglement of church and state, relying on the
"completely religious/merely religiously associated" distinction enunciated in Baltimore. The Board refused to classify the schools as completely religious, despite the employers' contentions that they were "minor seminary schools."'
The Board-ordered elections were subsequently held and bargaining
units were certified for the lay teachers at each group of schools. However, because the schools refused to recognize the unions, the unions filed
unfair labor practice complaints with the Board, alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. 1' The Board, in two substantially
similar opinions, s" granted summary judgments to the unions and ordered
the schools to bargain collectively with the unions, as well as to cease
their unfair labor practices. The employers contended that the Board had
failed to address itself fully to the constitutional issues raised in the petition for representation. The Board rejected that argument by pointing
out that its previous decision had ascertained that the schools were not
completely religious, but merely religiously associated, thus falling within
the Board's jurisdiction.'"
The employers appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which denied enforcement of the Board's orders."2 The court held
that the distinction between "completely religious" and "merely religious" schools, set forth in Baltimore and perpetuated by the Board in its
order to the employers, provided "no workable guide to the exercise of
discretion."' 8 The determination that an institution is so completely relicause of limitation by the grantor, are not available for use for operating expenses)
of not less than $1 million.
17. 220 N.L.R.B. at 360, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1226.
18. 220 N.L.R.B. at 359, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1225.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
20. Catholic Bishop, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 92 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1976); Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 92 L.R.R.M. 1550 (1976).
21. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1222, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1553. The Board further justified its decision
on the basis of Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114 (1976), in
which the Board held that "regulation of labor relations does not violate the First Amendment when it involves a minimal intrusion on religious conduct and is necessary to obtain
that objective." 224 N.L.R.B. at 1218.
22. Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 1118.
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gious that it excludes any significant secular elements would implicate

questions in the area of tradition and faith, and the court therefore declined to make that determination. It implicitly rejected the Baltimore
test.""

The court of appeals determined that the Board's jurisdiction would
interfere with the religious character of the schools in several areas. The
primary certification itself would call for an investigation which would

require the Board to consider the religious nature of the institution."5 The
requirement that the Bishop consult with the lay faculty's representative
would diminish his power to guide the school along the religious paths he

might deem proper.2' Additionally, the Board would be forced to consider
any unfair labor charge and to decide the extent to which religious considerations influenced the employer's decision to engage in a particular

labor practice. This procedure would be costly and lengthy, and the court
felt that the employer would tailor his conduct and decisions to steer
wide of the zone of impermissible conduct, further interfering with his
religious beliefs as to how the school should be operated.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Board's
jurisdiction extended to the situation in which a church-operated school
taught both secular and religious subjects, and whether that jurisdiction
would violate the guarantees of the religion clauses of the first amendment.'s The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, traced the

development of the Board's jurisdiction over nonprofit educational insti24. Id. For an excellent statement of the law's status prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Bishop, see McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978), decided after the Seventh Circuit decided Catholic Bishop. The court granted a preliminary
injunction restraining the NLRB from asserting jurisdiction over a parochial school, rejecting the Baltimore test and using th'three step test used in analyzing first amendment
free exercise claims:
First, it must be determined that a legitimate religious belief is held by the Plaintiff or under the facts . . . that the religious school ...
is pervasively religious.
Second, inquiry must be made whether the free exercise rights of the Plaintiff
would be either burdened or inhibited by the exercise of jurisdiction by the
NLRB. Last, if an affirmative answer is arrived at by the second inquiry, the government must show that the burdening of rights is justified by a compelling state
interest.
14. at 1351. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. 559 F.2d at 1123. Procedure for certification of a bargaining unit is set out in 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
26. 559 F.2d at 1123.
27. Id. at 1124. See Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (2d Cir. 1977), holding that
application of the Act to parochial elementary schools violated the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. The court found that there was a burden on the employer's freedom to
exercise his religious beliefs, and that the governmental interest was not sufficiently compelling to endanger individual rights. Id. at 3178.
28. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
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tutions and ascertained that the Board had a policy of asserting jurisdiction over all such institutions, whether secular or religious, which met its
jurisdictional criteria. s"
The Court first considered whether an assertion of jurisdiction would
create an "impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in
the affairs of. . . church-operated schools."8 It cited three of its recent
decisions which held that certain legislative controls on church-operated
schools were impermissible.8s The Court found that Board controls over
collective bargaining would be equally offensive. Regulation of this type
would necessarily result in orders and rulings which would conflict with
the religious mission of the school. Additionally, the process of inquiry
leading to its findings might of itself impinge on first amendment rights
of free exercise. 8' A final consequence of the Board's jurisdiction would be
the duty of the Board to determine mandatory subjects of bargaining
under the NLRA." This would place the religiously oriented institution
in the position of being forced to prove that its policies and actions were
based on religious requirements and were not "conditions of employment." The Board, on the other hand, would be placed in the equally
awkward position of deciding whether in fact the school was operating
from a religious motivation.
The Court then turned to the question of whether the Act was intended
to cover church-operated schools. It is an established judicial principle
that if possible an act of Congress should be construed so as to avoid any
constitutional violation." Therefore, the Court examined existing case
law for examples of standards of construction. It determined that an "affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed"' must be found in
order to conclude that legislation was meant to apply to a particular
area." Since no language on the face of the statute could be termed an
affirmative intention clearly expressed, the Court examined the legislative
29.

440 U.S. at 497.
30. Id. at 501.
31. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating state loans of instructional
materials, use of state funds for commercial transportation, and use of state school buses, by
parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating state loans of instructional materials of a secular nature to nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating state attempts to subsidize the costs of parochial school
education).
32. 440 U.S. at 502. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) details the investigatory procedure. See the
appendix to the opinion quoting the examination of the Director of Quigley North by the
Hearing Officer. It was included to illustrate the sensitivity of this inquiry process. 440 U.S.
at 507-08.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
34. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
35. 440 U.S. at 500.
36. Id.
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history of the NLRA.
The NLRA was enacted in 1935 to protect the rights of the American
worker to engage in collective bargaining. Congressional emphasis was
placed on industry and industrial employees,8 7 and no mention was made
of church-operated schools. In 1947, the scope of the term "employer" as
found in the 1935 Act was examined when the Labor-Management Relations Act was passed.u At that time, Congress amended the term to exclude nonprofit hospitals, since Congress deemed that these institutions
did not affect commerce. 89 However, in 1974 the exemption was removed;40 the Board contended that the amendment implied that Congress also approved the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over church-operated schools. The Court found this argument to be invalid, however,
because the amendment was passed in 1974, before any of the controversial cases concerning the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over that type of
school were decided. "1 Obviously, the legislature could not have been expressing an intention on an issue which had not yet arisen. Thus, in the
absence of "an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,"
the Court concluded that the word "employer" as found in the NLRA
was not intended to cover church-related schools.
Having determined that the NLRA was not intended to extend to religiously operated schools, the Court did not feel justified in basing its opinion on the employers' claim that Board jurisdiction would create impermissible entanglement between church and state, and therefore violate
the religion clauses of the first amendment. By employing statutory construction, the Court was able to avoid construing the NLRA "in a manner
that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive
questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion
37. The Wagner Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976)), provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
See also, 79 Cong. Rec. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner), 2 NLRB, LEGISLATrI HisTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RRLATIONS AcT, 1935, AT 2341-43 (1949).
38. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136. The
term "employer" was originally defined in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L.
No. 198, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449.
39. 440 U.S. at 505. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947); H.R. REP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Seas., Reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & Al. Nzws 1135.
40. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
41. 440 U.S. at 505-06.
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2

Clauses."
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the legislative history of the NLRA.43 Specifically, it found fault with the Court's
requirement that a clear expression of affirmative intent be found before
a statute may be construed to include a particular category of subjects."
The dissent pointed out that examples of clear legislative intent are infrequent in general statutes and noted the inconsistencies between the
"clear expression" test" and the test set forth in Machinists v. Street:"
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.'7
The dissent contended that the "affirmative expression" rule served to
release the "brake against wholesale judicial dismemberment of congressional enactments,' 48 and instead chose to adopt the "fairly possible" test
of Machinists.
The Court's construction of the statute, the dissent argued, was not
fairly possible. The term "employer" is defined in section 2(2) of the
NLRA:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or
any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve
Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone
acting
in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. 49
The dissent argued that to add another exception for church-related
schools would not be to construe the provision, but rather to amend it."
The dissent found that the legislative history of the NLRA led to the
conclusion that it was never intended to exclude religiously operated
42. Id. at 507.
43. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 509.
45. Id. The clear expression test was first articulated in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963). The dissent criticized the majority's
reliance on the case, saying that McCulloch was decided in the face of an abundance of
contrary legislative history, whereas in Catholic Bishop there was no contrary legislative
history.
46. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
47. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
48. 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
50. 440 U.S. at 511.
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schools as employers.5 1
Since the dissent concluded that the NLRA was intended to extend to
lay teachers in the church-operated schools, it contended that the Court
should have reached the constitutional issue. Instead, the Court chose to
"avoid it by a cavalier exercise in statutory interpretation which succeeds
only in defying congressional intent." 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Bishop came at a time when
guidance was needed in the area of Board jurisdiction over lay teachers at
parochial schools. Thus, the decision should be accorded a critical look to
examine the standard which the Court articulated.
The problem facing the Court was to decide whether the government's
interest in protecting the freedom of lay teachers to form unions for mutual aid and protections" should be allowed to override the religious freedoms of the employer schools. The Court spent considerable time discussing the consequences of permitting the Board to assert jurisdiction,5 and
pointed out the specific areas in which Board procedures would infringe
on the religious rights of the institution. However, despite its lengthy
discussion of the first amendment problems, the Court did not decide the
case on a constitutional basis. It chose instead to resolve the issue by statutory interpretation.
The requirement that a case be decided on a statutory basis if possible
seems to be sound. It forces the Court to make the narrowest decision
possible, thus precluding any judicial influence on related areas in which
a constitutional precedent not only would be unnecessary but also might
be restrictive. Although the determination to seek a solution by statutory
interpretation was proper, the result reached by the Court is somewhat
tenuous. The Court adopted the "clear intention affirmatively expressed"
test." Finding no expression on the face of the statute, it turned to the
legislative history of section 2(2); here the Court did some rather creative
analysis. It reasoned that since there was no affirmative mention of the
application of the NLRA to religiously oriented schools in that history,
the NLRA was not intended to include them. This logic is the type that
would force Congress to be tediously specific in drafting its statutes. As a
result, in many situations to which the statute ought to apply, individuals
51. Id. at 517. The dissent relied on H.R REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974),
which stated that "the only broad area of charitable, eleemosynary, educational institutions
wherein the Board does not now exercise jurisdiction concerns the nonprofit hospitals,
explicitly excluded by section 2(2) of the Act."

52. 440 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).

54. 440 U.S. at 497-99, 501-04.
55.
56.

See text accompanying notes 31-33.
See note 45 supra.
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would be denied its protection because it was too narrow.
The Court's consideration of the NLRA's legislative history is further
weakened by the fact that the issue of Board jurisdiction in church
schools did not arise until after the most recent development in the legislative history of section 2(2). Thus, the Court's arguments by analogy do
not have great force, since there is no evidence at all that Congress ever
had the situation in mind. Indeed, the House Report which extended
Board jurisdiction to nonprofit hospitals seems to indicate that if Congress had considered the matter, it would have granted jurisdiction to the
7
5

Board.

One aspect of the decision in Catholic Bishop is particularly noteworthy. The Court felt that the entanglement issue was important enough
to discuss in depth and with great specificity, but yet went to great
lengths to find a legislative expression that the schools should be excluded from Board jurisdiction. It appears that the Court felt that Board
jurisdiction over these schools. would implicate first amendment questions. A reluctance to address these issues may have led the Court to seek
a statutory "escape" for which it might not have searched so diligently
had there been no pressing first amendment questions.
The cases decided after Catholic Bishop are useful in pointing out the
weakness in the decision. The most obvious conclusion is that Catholic
Bishop did not succeed in resolving the uncertainty in the area. The
Court's holding that the term "employer" as used in the NLRA does not
extend to lay teachers in church-operated schools gives potential union
organizers the opportunity to assert that, in any particular case, the
school is not church-operated in the Catholic Bishop sense.
The Board used this tactic in Bishop Ford." It claimed that the school
in question was not church-operated, despite the fact that its trustees,
administrators and faculty members were predominantly members of
Catholic religious orders, because the board of trustees was not directly
controlled by the Diocese. The appellate court denied jurisdiction, holding that the critical factor was the religious mission of the school, 5" and
that the Court in Catholic Bishop had "employed the term 'church-operated' not in the restricted sense ... but rather as a convenient method of
characterizing schools with a religious mission."" This "religious mission"
standard sounds suspiciously like the completely religious/religiously oriented test articulated in Baltimore. However, under Baltimore, a merely
religiously oriented school would have been subject to Board jurisdiction,
whereas the decision in Bishop Ford seems to suggest that a school with a
57.
58.
59.

The report relied on was H.R. REP. No. 1051, supra note 51.
NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Cath. High School, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 823.

60. Id.
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"religious mission" might not be subject to Board jurisdiction. Thus, the
decision in Bishop Ford narrows the jurisdictional reach of the Board.
Naturally, the next inquiry must be into how religiously oriented a
school must be in order to qualify as having a religious mission. The
Board, in its certification process, will be forced to consider the religious
nature of each school." This inquiry will eventually lead to the Board's
questioning the institution's religious beliefs, which was one of the very
procedures the majority in Catholic Bishop felt was a potential first
amendment intrusion. Thus, the Court's decision, viewed in light of the
subsequent decision in Bishop Ford, seems to have forced a return to the
potential constitutional violations objected to by the schools in the days
before the issue was "settled" by the Supreme Court.
The Court in Catholic Bishop avoided reaching the first amendment
infringement claims of the employer schools. However, if the approach
taken in Bishop Ford is tested, the Court may be forced to face the constitutional issue. If this occurs, the Court may find guidance in the Title
VII6 area, in which first amendment problems similar to those found in
Catholic Bishop arise. The cases illustrate that the EEOC has also had
difficulty resolving the issue. Dotter v. Wahlert" dealt with the claim of a
teacher at a Catholic high school that she had been fired as a result of sex
discrimination. The court found an "affirmative intention clearly expressed" that Title VII should apply to sectarian schools," and thus
reached the constitutional issue. The court granted jurisdiction, distinguishing Catholic Bishop as involving an entire area, whereas the grant of
jurisdiction to the EEOC in Dotter involved only one individual claim."
In a second Title VII case, EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary," the EEOC sought to establish jurisdiction over a religious
seminary, but the court held that such an assertion would infringe on the
employer's free exercise of religion. 67 The court said that as the function
of an institution becomes increasingly religious, the risk of impermissible
entanglement becomes dramatically greater, and that because of South61. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
62. "Title VII" refers to title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to
2000e-17 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979 & Supp. I 1980), covering equal employment opportunity. Section 2000e-4(a) created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
§ 2000e-4(g) provides that the Commission is empowered to enforce the provisions of Title

VII.
63. 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
64. Id. at 269. The court held that Title VII applied when the charge was one of sex
discrimination, not one of religious discrimination.
65. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
66. 485 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
67. Id. at 260.
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western's status as a seminary, the risk was too great to be avoided. 8
Obviously, these two Title VII cases relied on different standards; Dolter
focused on the instant effects, while Southwestern Baptist considered the
long range effects, holding that because the likelihood of intrusion was
great, the EEOC should not assert jurisdiction.
It is difficult to perceive any significantly different aspect of entanglement between governmental protection of an employee's right to be free
from unfair labor practices and protection of an employee's right to be
free from unjust employment practices. Governmental intrusion in either
area would raise the same types of entanglement problems, and it seems
anomalous that a lay teacher at a Catholic high school may complain of
sex discrimination, but not that her employer engages in unfair labor
practices.
The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Bishop is a strained one, at
best. It decides the issue on a narrow statutory ground, the validity of
which is questionable. A large part of the opinion is spent discussing a
constitutional issue that the Court does not care to reach. Subsequent
cases, in applying Catholic Bishop, have forced the Board and the courts
to interpret the term "church-operated," a term which was undefined by
the Supreme Court. This interpretation puts the courts squarely in the
position in which they found themselves before Catholic Bishop, when
the religiously oriented/completely religious test of Baltimore was employed. Additionally, for no apparent reason, the EEOC is allowed jurisdiction over religiously oriented schools in some cases while the NLRB is
not. In short, it is extremely unlikely that the rule of Catholic Bishop will
prove to be satisfactory. Further judicial or legislative action will be required to provide the necessary guidance in this unsettled area.
LAURME

68.

Id.
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